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BURRELL V. ARMIJO: THE ROLE OF COMITY IN FEDERAL COURT
REVIEW OF TRIBAL COURT JUDGMENTS
Erin Garcia
Erin Garcia discusses the on-going issue of tribal versus federal judicial power. While
tribal courts have been recognized as an important aspect of tribal sovereignty, federal precedent
has diluted tribal authority. This dilution of authority is evident by the restriction on jurisdiction
given to the tribal courts by the federal government. The author explores this issue using the
case of Burrell v. Armijo. She contends that this Tenth Circuit case demonstrates the continued
undermining of tribal jurisdiction and that the general rule for federal courts to give great
deference to tribal courts was not properly applied, leading to continued weakening of tribal
jurisdiction and tribal sovereignty by the federal judiciary.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Tribal courts have played a significant and unique, if somewhat uncertain, role in both
federal and Indian jurisprudence. At various times throughout their history, tribal courts have
been recognized as important institutions representing tribal authority and protecting tribal
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sovereignty1 while at the same time the legitimacy of tribal court power is undermined by federal
precedent.2
An important and inherent power of any sovereign is the ability to make and enforce its
own laws.3 The federal government 4 has recognized that this inherent power is vested in Indian
tribes. This recognition is reflected in the federal policy of promoting tribal justice systems. 5 At
the same time, however, the federal government, and the federal courts in particular, have
severely restricted the jurisdiction of tribal courts.6 For example, while tribal courts maintain
exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction over Indians, 7 they have no criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians.8 Further, civil jurisdiction over non-Indians is slowly being whittled away. 9

1

See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978) (“Tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as
appropriate forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and property interests of
both Indians and non-Indians.”); see also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 324 (1978) (enforcing laws is an
“exercise of retained tribal sovereignty”); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959) (a state may not infringe on a
tribe‟s rights to “make their own laws and be ruled by them”).
2
See infra note 9.
3
E.g., Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 320.
4
Congress has “paramount” authority over Indians. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). This is so
because “it has never existed anywhere else, because the theater of its exercise is within the geographical limits of
the United States, because it has never been denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.” Id. at
567. Congress‟ plenary power over Indian tribes gives it the authority to limit and/or recognize tribal sovereignty,
which includes limiting or recognizing the power of tribal courts. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 56.
Conversely, the federal judiciary‟s role is reputed to be more limited. See id. at 72. Thus, if the court oversteps its
bounds in trying to limit tribal court authority, Congress can supersede it with legislation. See e.g., the Indian Pueblo
Land Act Amendments, P.L. 109-133, 119 Stat. 2573 (2005), in response to State v. Romero, 84 P.3d 670 (N.M.
App. Ct. 2003); see also the “Duro fix”, an amendment to the Indian Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. 101-511 § 8077(b)
(1990) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2000)), in response to Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
5
See Indian Tribal Justice Act, 25 U.S.C. § 3601(5) (2000) ([T]ribal justice systems are an essential part of tribal
governments and serve as important forums for ensuring public health and safety and the political integrity of tribal
governments.”); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14-15 (1987) (“Tribal courts play a vital role in tribal
self-government, and the Federal Government has consistently encouraged their development.”); Montana v.
Gilham, 133 F.3d 1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Development of tribal court systems is a critical component of tribal
self-government, one which courts have encouraged.”).
6
A limit on tribal authority may be through an express act of Congress or it may be implied. See Wheeler, 435 U.S.
at 323. The theory of “implicit divestiture” introduced by the Supreme Court contends that tribes were “divested . . .
of some aspects of . . . sovereignty” because of their incorporation into the U.S. See id.
7
See FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 756-57(Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., ed.
2005) (“As sovereigns, tribes possess the power to exercise at least concurrent jurisdiction over all crimes
committed by an Indian against the person or property of another Indian in Indian country. Tribes also have
exclusive jurisdiction over all crimes committed by an Indian in Indian country not listed as major crimes in the
Major Crimes Act (MCA); however, Congress may have altered some tribes' traditional powers by authorizing states
to exercise concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction.”) [hereinafter COHEN].
8
See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (holding that a tribal court has no criminal
misdemeanor jurisdiction over non-members on tribal lands).
9
See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) and Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (holding
tribes do not have civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on non-Indian fee land unless one of two exceptions apply);
Nat‟l Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985) (holding federal courts have the
authority to review jurisdiction of tribal court); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (holding tribes do not have
jurisdiction over non-Indian state actors performing state discharged duties on tribal lands, tribal courts do not have
jurisdiction to hear § 1983 claims, and tribal courts may lose jurisdiction if there are substantial off-reservation
effects).
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The Tenth Circuit case Burrell v. Armijo10 is another blow to tribal court jurisdiction.
The case arose from a dispute between a non-Indian couple and various tribal officials over a
farm lease on Indian land.11 The case was dismissed from tribal court on grounds of sovereign
immunity. 12 On appeal from the tribe‟s request for enforcement by the federal district court, the
Tenth Circuit granted the plaintiff non-Indian‟s request to declare the tribal court judgment null
and void.13
This note argues that a federal court‟s employment of comity to declare a tribal court
judgment null and void based on tribal violation of due process is potentially devastating for
tribal courts because it swallows the general rule that federal courts should give great deference
to tribal courts.14 The rule is swallowed in two ways. First, Congress and the Supreme Court
have already precluded federal courts from reviewing due process violations through passage of
the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) 15 and the decision in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.16 The
Burrell holding completely disregards federal policy.17 Second, because tribal courts are only
bound by the ICRA, traditional notions of due process under comity, as the court applied here,
should not apply to tribal judgments.18
This note concludes that the most disturbing aspect of Burrell is that the Tenth Circuit
could have refused to recognize the tribal court judgment based on jurisdiction, thereby reaching
the same result without impugning the tribal court.19
II. BACKGROUND
This case arose from a farm lease granted to the non-Indian Burrells for land owned by
Santa Ana Pueblo.20 The original lease was granted in 1980 for ten years and was extended
twice. 21 The Burrells claimed that they were continually assured by pueblo officials that they
would be able to stay on this land as long as they sustained the farming operation.22 By most
accounts, the Burrells had an amicable relationship with pueblo leaders as well as other members
of the community. 23 However, in early 1997, a change of administration in the pueblo leadership
disrupted this relationship.24
The Burrells claimed that certain individuals of this new administration, including newly
named Governor Leonard Armijo, wanted the Burrells off of their leased farm land and off the
10

456 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1167 (2007).
Id. at 1161.
12
Id. at 1165. Like all other sovereigns, tribes enjoy immunity from civil suit. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (“Indian tribes have long been recognized as possessing the common-law immunity from
suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers . . . This aspect of tribal sovereignty, like all others, is subject to the
superior and plenary control of Congress. But without congressional authorization, the Indian nations are exempt
from suit.”).
13
Burrell, 456 F.3d at 1175.
14
See infra note 57.
15
25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (2000) (originally enacted Apr. 11, 1968).
16
436 U.S. 49 (1978).
17
See infra Section IV-A.
18
See infra Section IV-B.
19
See infra Section IV-C.
20
Burrell v. Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2006).
21
Id. at 1162.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
11

20

Tribal Law Journal

Vol. 10

pueblo. 25 They further claimed that the tribal council voted for a resolution offering them
$500,000 to buy out the lease but individual officials ignored the tribal council resolution and
tried to negotiate a lower price in lieu of offering other terms.26 Ultimately, it was alleged life
was made so miserable for the Burrells that they were effectively driven off their leased land and
forced to abandon their lease.27
In April 1998, the Burrells brought an action against the tribe and the individual tribal
officials in the Federal District Court for the District of New Mexico for civil rights violations
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and 1985. 28 The district court dismissed the case because the
Burrells had not exhausted their tribal court remedies.29 Thus, the Burrells filed the same claims
in Santa Ana Tribal Court in October 1998.30 The tribal court held two days of evidentiary
hearings in February 2000. However, motions filed by the Burrells 31 were never ruled on and no
other action was taken on the case in tribal court as of May 2002.32 This was approximately
three and half years since the Burrells originally filed their tribal court claim.
Due to this extended delay, the Burrells re-filed their claims in district court.33 This time
the district court stayed the proceedings and gave the tribal court six months to take action on the
case. 34 The tribal court, under a different judge than the judge presiding over the initial tribal
proceedings, dismissed the case on grounds of sovereign immunity. 35
The tribal court then informed the district court of its ruling and asked the court to
dismiss the federal claims still pending in the district court.36 At the same time, the Burrells
asked the district court to declare the tribal court judgment null and void because they were not
afforded due process in the tribal court proceedings.37 Thus, the question before the district court
was whether to enforce the tribal court judgment by dismissing the federal case or decline to
enforce it by declaring it null and void.
The district court found in favor of the tribe. 38 The Burrells then appealed and the Tenth
Circuit reversed in part 39 finding that the Burrells were denied due process by the tribal court,
25

Id.
Burrell, 456 F.3d at 1162.
27
Id. at 1162-63. In response to the Burrells‟ claims, the tribe claimed that no such tribal resolution for a $500,000
offer was ever made and the Burrells had informed tribal officials they were abandoning their lease because their
loan had been foreclosed. See Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 6, Burrell v. Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2006)
(No. 03-2223), 2003 WL 25514935.
28
Burrell, 456 F.3d at 1164.
29
Id. See infra Section IV-C for an explanation of the exhaustion doctrine.
30
Burrell, 456 F.3d at 1164.
31
The Burrells filed several motions in tribal court including “motions to compel discovery, a motion for an
evidentiary hearing, and a motion for a temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction to prevent tribal
official from harassing tribal members who provided assistance to the Burrells.” Id.
32
Id. at 1165.
33
Id. at 1164-65.
34
Id. at 1165.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 1165-66.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 1166. The district court held it could not re-adjudicate issues previously decided in tribal court even if there
were due process concerns. However, it did reach the merits of the Burrells‟ due process claims and held that the
Burrells were afforded adequate due process in the tribal court. Id.
39
Reversed in part because the Tenth Circuit dismissed the § 1983 claim for failure to state a claim and further held
that the tribe was, in fact, immune from suit; thus, the Burrells could only pursue their claims against the individual
tribal officials. Id. at 1175. However, under Santa Clara Pueblo, the tribal officials are still immune from suit if
26
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thus the tribal court judgment was not entitled to recognition by the district court.40 The case
was then remanded to the district court to proceed on the merits of the Burrells‟ civil rights
claims against individual tribal officials.
III. RATIONALE
The Tenth Circuit refused to recognize the tribal court judgment holding that the tribal court
proceedings failed to meet basic tenants of due process under principles of comity and collateral
estoppel.41 The court held that both of these doctrines applied but did not distinguish between
the two in the holding. This note will briefly discuss the court‟s discussion of each and then
discuss its holding in a separate sub-section.
A. Comity
Citing a Tenth Circuit case and a Ninth Circuit case, the court held that comity is the
proper doctrine to apply to the recognition of tribal court judgments. 42 Comity is “neither a
matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor mere courtesy and good will, upon the
other.”43 Thus, under comity, federal courts have wide latitude to review any and all aspects of
tribal court judgments and are not bound to recognize them. Further, under comity, there are
“two mandatory grounds for refusing to recognize or enforce a tribal court judgment . . . if the
tribal court lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction, or if the defendant was denied due
process of law.”44
Under the doctrine of comity, the court held that due process means an “opportunity for a
full and fair trial before an impartial tribunal that conducts the trial upon regular proceedings
after proper service or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and . . . there is no showing of
prejudice in the tribal court or in the system of governing laws.”45 Further, the Court cited other
possible due process violations which would preclude comity including evidence that “the
judiciary is dominated by the political branches or by an opposing litigant, or that a party was
unable to obtain counsel, or secure documents or attendance of witnesses, or to have access to
appeal.”46
B. Collateral Estoppel
In its motions to dismiss, the tribe claimed that the Burrells should not be allowed to
pursue remedies in federal court based on collateral estoppel.47 That is, the tribe claimed that the
Burrells were precluded from attempting to re-litigate their claims in federal court because the
they were acting in their official capacity. See United States v. Oregon, 657 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Davis
v. Littell, 398 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1968); White Mountain Apache Indian Tribe v. Shelley, 480 P.2d 654 (Ariz. 1971)).
40
Burrell, 456 F.3d at 1175.
41
Id. at 1173.
42
Id. at 1171 (citing Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997); MacArthur v. San Juan County, 309 F.3d
1216 (10th Cir. 2002)).
43
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
44
Burrell, 456 F.3d at 1171.
45
Id. at 1171-72.
46
Id. at 1172.
47
Id. at 1165.
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tribal court “had fully adjudicated the Burrells‟ claims.” 48 The Tenth Circuit ruled against the
tribe on this issue as well because collateral estoppel also has a due process element.
The court may only apply collateral estoppel as a bar to re-litigation if four requirements
are met, only one of which is relevant here: “the party against whom the doctrine is raised had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action.”49 This requirement, the court
held, is an element of due process.50 Thus, the court can also reverse on due process grounds
under collateral estoppel. 51 Some factors the court considers when determining whether a party
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate include, “whether there were significant procedural
limitations in the prior proceeding, whether the party had the incentive to litigate fully the issue,
or whether effective litigation was limited by the nature of the relationship of the parties.”52
C. Holding
The court refused to recognize the tribal court judgment for the following reasons which,
the court held, fall under either the due process analysis of comity or collateral estoppel, or both.
The Tenth Circuit was especially troubled by the close relationship between the tribal court, the
Pueblo, and the individual tribal officials.53 Other violations the court pointed to were the
procedural posture leading up to the courts discussion including the fact the first judge did not
rule on motions for nearly four years and the second judge dismissed the case without any
hearings. 54 Furthermore, the dismissing judge did not reference any of the prior hearings in the
decision or give explanation for the ruling. 55 Finally, the Tenth Circuit was concerned that the
tribal judiciary lacked an appellate court.56
IV. ANALYSIS
The Tenth Circuit makes a passing reference to the general rule of deference to tribal
courts. However, Burrell makes clear that the Tenth Circuit will not follow the general rule
when faced with the opportunity to do so. By using comity, the decision creates a broad and
potentially devastating exception which swallows the general rule. The „exception‟ is at odds
with Supreme Court precedent, federal legislation, and federal policy.
First, federal legislation and Supreme Court precedent have precluded federal courts from
reviewing due process in tribal courts. Second, even if federal courts can apply comity to tribal
court judgments, traditional notions of comity should not be applied to tribal courts because of
57

48

Id. at 1166.
Id. at 1172. The other requirements are: the issue previously decided is identical with the one presented in the
action in question, the prior action has been finally adjudicated on the merits, and the party against whom the
doctrine is invoked was a party, or in privity with a party, to the prior adjudication. Id. The court held these
requirements were satisfied. Id.
50
Burrell, 456 F.3d at 1172 (“[D]ue process requires that a party have a full and fair opportunity to litigate its case.”
(quoting Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461(1982))).
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 1173.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
“[T]he federal policies promoting tribal self-government and self-determination instruct us to provide great
deference to tribal court systems, their practices, and procedures.” Id.
49
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their unique nature, their responsibility under the ICRA, and the federal policy promoting selfgovernment. Rather, it should be applied in a manner that takes into consideration the unique
law that applies to Indian tribes. Finally, and perhaps most troubling, the court could have
avoided this „exception‟ all together and still reached the same result.
A. Indian Civil Rights Act and Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez
The Tenth Circuit declaring that a federal court can refuse to recognize a tribal judgment
for denial of due process creates an avenue to federal review of tribal court due process that is in
conflict with the intent of the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) 58 and Supreme Court precedent59.
Both leave no room for review by a federal court of whether a tribe has followed, or should
follow, certain due process requirements.
This is not to say that tribal courts do not have to provide any due process rights to
litigants. In fact, they do have to provide very specific ones, 60 but it is important to remember
that tribes are not bound by the U.S. Constitution.61 The ICRA contains only rights the U.S.
government has mandated tribes to provide to people appearing before their courts.62 Further,
and perhaps more importantly, these are the only rights that Congress thought appropriate to
impose on Indian tribes.
The fact that the ICRA protected rights are not as extensive as constitutionally protected
rights is intentional. “The legislative history of ICRA indicates that these omissions reflect a

58

25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (2000).
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
60
See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000). No tribe in exercising power of self government shall:
(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition for a redress of grievances;
(2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue warrants, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized;
(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy;
(4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against himself;
(5) take any private property for a public use without just compensation;
(6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and at his own expense to have the assistance of counsel for
his defense;
(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and unusual punishments, and in no event
impose for conviction of any one offense any penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a term
of one year and a fine of $5,000, or both;
(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or deprive any person of
liberty or property without due process of law;
(9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or
(10) deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment the right, upon request, to a trial
by jury of not less than six persons.
61
Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 56 (“As separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution, tribes have historically
been regarded as unconstrained by those constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or
state authority”); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382 (1896) (“[T]he powers of local government exercised by [the
tribe] are [not] federal powers created by and springing from the Constitution of the United States.”).
62
See COHEN, supra note 7, at 959-60. Of course, tribes can include other rights in their constitutions. See id. at 95051.
59
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deliberate choice by Congress to limit its intrusion into traditional tribal independence.”63 Thus,
in its efforts to promote tribal self-government, Congress affirmatively legislated on the issue
and since Congress has exercised its plenary power in the area, federal courts should decline
from extending or implying other due process restrictions on tribes. 64
After the passage of the ICRA, federal courts tried to interpret the statute by allowing
individuals to bring suit against tribes for ICRA violations. 65 However, the ICRA not only
contains what rights a tribe must provide but also provides that the only federal remedy for
violation is the writ of habeas corpus.66 There is no provision in the ICRA allowing individuals
to bring due process claims against a tribe in federal court for review.
The central holding in Santa Clara Pueblo67 which challenged this lack of federal remedy
is that any ICRA violation should be addressed exclusively by the tribal court. 68 Thus, the
practice of federal court review of the ICRA is effectively stopped and Congress has never
limited the Santa Clara Pueblo holding. 69
In Santa Clara Pueblo,70 a female tribal member brought suit against the tribe claiming
that the tribe‟s membership requirements were discriminatory and that they violated a section of
the ICRA which provides that “[n]o Indian tribe . . . shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws.”71 The Supreme Court held that the ICRA provides
no federal remedy on its face and the Court would not find one implicitly, especially when
Congress has such broad power over Indian affairs.72 Allowing suits would not only “undermine
the authority of tribal forums . . . but it would also impose serious financial burdens on already
“financially disadvantaged” tribes.” 73 Further, the Court held, tribal courts are an appropriate
and available forum to “vindicate rights created by ICRA.”74
The ruling in Burrell makes Santa Clara Pueblo meaningless in respect to review of
tribal court due process analysis, at least in the Tenth Circuit. Granted, the Burrells were not
suing the tribe for the alleged due process violations, as they did not bring an ICRA suit. They
simply wanted to re-litigate their claims in federal court. Thus, this case can be distinguished
from Santa Clara Pueblo and, therefore, it cannot be said that the Tenth Circuit directly
disregarded controlling Supreme Court precedent. But, in effect, that is exactly what the court
63

Id. at 953.
Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 72.
65
See e.g., Howlett v. Salish Kootenal Tribes, 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976); Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States,
515 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1975); McCurdy v. Steele, 506 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1974); Crowe v. Eastern Band of
Cherokee Indians, Inc., 506 F.2d 1231 (4th Cir. 1974); Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1973); Johnson
v. Lower Elwha Tribal Cmty., 484 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1973); Luxon v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 455 F.2d 698 (8th Cir.
1972).
66
25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2000).
67
Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 49.
68
Id. at 65.
69
See also, THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT: A REPORT OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 74 (June 1991)
(discussing that in 1986, Congress enlisted the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights to conduct a study of the
enforcement of ICRA. The Commission concluded that with proper federal support and money, tribes are fully
capable of effectively enforcing the ICRA and amending ICRA to provide for federal review should be a “means of
last resort.”) [hereinafter ICRA REPORT].
70
Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 49.
71
Id. at 51.
72
Id. at 60 (“[A] proper respect both for tribal sovereignty itself and for the plenary authority of Congress in this
area cautions that we tread lightly in the absence of clear indications of legislative intent.”).
73
Id. at 64.
74
Id. at 65.
64
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did and apparently exactly what the court wanted to do in respect to reviewing the due process
accorded by a tribal court. In other words, the court wanted to give the Burrells a way around
the ICRA and Santa Clara Pueblo by allowing relief not otherwise permitted under the Supreme
Court ruling in Santa Clara Pueblo, and the Court found a way through the doctrine of comity. 75
The ICRA and Santa Clara Pueblo encompass the federal policy that there should be
limited federal intrusion on tribal court proceedings. 76 Thus, although the Tenth Circuit did not
specifically disregard precedent, it did disregard this federal policy. Since tribal court litigants
are barred from bringing a direct suit against a tribe for due process violations, the Tenth Circuit
found another way to intrude on tribal court proceedings by reviewing due process under
misguided principles of comity. While the facts and legal principles in Burrell may be different,
this holding has accomplished the result that Congress, via the ICRA, and the Supreme Court,
via Santa Clara Pueblo, were trying to prevent: federal review of due process in tribal courts.
B. Comity
Even though the Tenth Circuit found a way around the ICRA and Santa Clara Pueblo to
review due process, it still erred because traditional notions of due process under comity should
not be applied to tribal courts. First of all, comity may not even be the appropriate principle for
federal courts to apply to tribal courts. However, if it is, it must be adjusted to adhere to the
unique and inherent differences in tribal courts.
i. Comity v. Full Faith and Credit
Comity has commonly been applied by states to tribal judgments and vice versa. 77 This
case stands out because it is a federal case. The federal approach to tribal court judgments has
been deference78 or application of the exhaustion doctrine.79 Except for a few notable
exceptions,80 including this case, comity in its traditional sense has not been applied by federal
courts to tribal courts.81
The application of comity by federal courts also seems to be in conflict with the
Congressional policy of requiring recognition of tribal court judgments based on the full faith
and credit doctrine. While there is no consensus or positive legislation on whether states and/or
the federal courts should apply full faith and credit to all tribal court judgments,82 Congress has
recognized several instances where tribal court judgments must be afforded full faith and credit.83
75

See infra Section IV-B.
COHEN, supra note 7, at 956.
77
Id. at 660-61.
78
See Burrell v. Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159, 1173 (10th Cir. 2006).
79
See infra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
80
See AT & T Corp. v. Coeur D‟Alene Tribe, 295 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 2002); MacArthur v. San Juan County, 309
F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2002); Bird v. Glacier Elec. Coop., 255 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2001); Wilson v. Marchington, 127
F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997).
81
Exhaustion has been referred to as a matter of comity. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987).
However, here I refer to cases in which federal courts use the traditional doctrine of comity as described in Section
III-A, supra.
82
Indian tribes are not recognized specifically in the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution, U.S. Const.
art. IV, § 1, nor the subsequently enacted statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000). It could be argued that Indian tribes are
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Two state cases have also explicitly held that tribal court judgments are entitled to full
faith and credit. First, in Sheppard v. Sheppard,84 the Idaho Supreme Court held “[t]ribal court
decrees, while not precisely equivalent to decrees of the courts of sister states, are nevertheless
entitled to full faith and credit.”85 The court rested its reasoning on the desire to “facilitate better
relations between courts of this state and the various tribal courts within Idaho.” 86 Second, Jim
v. CIT Financial Services Corp. 87 was a choice of law case rather than an enforcement action;
however, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the Navajo Nation‟s laws, which plaintiff
sought to apply to his claim in state court, “are entitled by Federal Law, 28 U.S.C. 1738, to full
faith and credit in the Courts of New Mexico because the Navajo Nation is a „territory‟ within
the meaning of the statute.”88 Further, in Santa Clara Pueblo,89 the United States Supreme Court
also held in dicta that “[j]udgments of tribal courts, to matters properly within their jurisdiction,
have been regarded in some circumstances as entitled to full faith and credit in other courts.” 90
While neither state cases nor Supreme Court dicta are binding on the Tenth Circuit, these
examples are persuasive authority, particularly the New Mexico case and the Santa Clara Pueblo
dicta.
Thus far neither the individual statutes nor the state court decisions have been extended to
require full faith and credit as to tribal court judgments in general, however, they seem to
indicate a trend towards recognizing tribal court judgments. Such recognition falls in line with
the overall federal policy of protecting tribal sovereignty.

and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in courts of such State, Territory or Possession from
which they are taken.”). However, there is no indication that Congress intended to include Indian tribes within the
meaning of the statute and, further, considering Indian tribes as territories is at odds with federal Indian law treating
tribes as separate sovereigns. See Robert Laurence, The Enforcement of Judgments Across Indian Reservation
Boundaries: Full Faith and Credit, Comity, and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 OR. L. REV. 589, 652 (1990).
Interestingly, as Laurence points out, federal courts are not explicitly mentioned in the statute, however, there is
little question that states, territories and possessions must recognize federal court judgments. Id.
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Under full faith and credit, parties are only allowed to bring procedural arguments
against non-enforcement, i.e. that the rendering court lacked jurisdiction. 91 Substantive defenses
are not allowed, i.e. lack of due process. 92 Thus, unless the rendering court lacked jurisdiction,
the receiving court must enforce the judgment. Because of the limited review allowed under full
faith and credit, this doctrine is more compatible with the federal policy of protecting tribal
sovereignty. Recognizing a tribal court judgment under full faith and credit limits federal
intrusion and demonstrates respect of tribal courts as competent institutions, which in turn is
recognition of tribal sovereignty itself.
ii. Comity as Applied to Tribal Courts
Even if comity is the right principle to apply when considering federal recognition of
tribal court judgments, it necessarily requires adjustment for tribal courts. The unique nature of
tribal courts and the federal policy of promoting tribal self-government require some adjustment
in the application of comity to tribal court judgments.
Arguably, the federal courts adhering to the doctrine of comity have been more than
willing to adjust it when applied to tribal courts but in a way that hurts tribes rather than
promotes tribal authority. Comity, however, is designed to facilitate inter-governmental cooperation. This is evidenced by the fact that if a “[ judgment] was issued in a nation that abides
by the rule of law and the court issuing the judgment has fair procedures, it is exceedingly rare
for a United States court to refuse to enforce the foreign judgment.”93 The underlying reason
behind this policy is that there is “no one particular set of procedures that embody due
process.”94 Further, “this doctrine does not ordinarily result in the nonenforcement of foreign
nation judgments.”95 Rather “it is premised on the mutual respect that nations have for the
ability of each nation to govern events there in accord with their own norms and procedures.” 96
Federal courts, however, have taken the exact opposite approach than the one described
above when applying comity to tribes. They do not use comity as a way of enhancing intergovernmental relations and showing respect for tribes as independent sovereigns capable of
enforcing laws with equality and fairness. Instead, federal courts posture the importance of tribal
courts and then completely de-legitimize them. 97 This departure from the norms of comity is not
sensible because the policy reasons for recognizing tribal court judgments are just as strong as
the reasons for recognizing those of foreign nations, and perhaps even stronger.
Indian tribes . . . have been made fragile through dealings with the United States
government, dealings that have not always met modern standards of humanity and
fairness. Given this historical background, we non-Indians must by very careful
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that our later dealings with the Indians do not result in further degradation or
destruction of these important governments. 98
With these important policy reasons in mind, if the court is going to use comity, then it
should be modified for tribal courts and the ICRA should be the standard against which tribal
court proceedings are weighed. The traditional notions of due process implicit in the comity
doctrine discussed supra in Section III-A should not be applied in such a strict sense to tribal
courts. This proposition was asserted in Wilson v. Marchington99 but without much elaboration
and it has not been clearly developed since. The Tenth Circuit does little if anything to help with
the cause. However, it seems intuitive that the most obvious adjustment of comity for tribal
courts is that federal courts should look at the ICRA provisions, as well as the Congressional
policy behind it, for guidance when reviewing due process.
The balancing test referred to in Santa Clara Pueblo is most instructive.100 When
interpreting the nature of the right involved, the court should weigh “preventing injustices
perpetrated by tribal governments, on the one hand, and, on the other, avoiding undue or
precipitous interference in the affairs of the Indian people.”101 The balancing test is appropriate
because it takes into account the fact that vast differences in tribal courts make it difficult to
apply a single notion of due process to all tribes across the country. The differences among tribal
courts are a result of many things including “the size of tribes, their wealth and other resources,
the importance of traditions, and the needs of the community.” 102 Further, tribes are free to set
up their courts however they feel appropriate, save for the restrictions found in the ICRA.103 The
effect of this freedom is that not all tribal courts look or operate the same. These differences
should be taken into account whenever a federal court undertakes a due process review of tribal
court proceedings.
The balancing test also shows a respect for tribal customs and traditions. When applying
the balancing test, the court must keep in mind that Congress intentionally left out certain
constitutional rights.104 Thus, when interpreting the rights provided by the ICRA, tribal customs
and any practices which provide due process must also be taken into account because the ICRA
was not intended to disturb customary law. Subsequent Congressional legislation has also
affirmed the position that tribal customs are important tools for tribal courts.105 Further, federal
courts should apply the ICRA as interpreted by tribes. “[T]here is a definite trend by tribal
courts toward the view that they ha[ve] leeway in interpreting the ICRA‟s due process and equal
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See Indian Tribal Justice Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601-02, 3611-14, 3621, 3631 (2000). “The Congress finds and
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protection clauses and need not follow the U.S. Supreme Court precedents jot for jot.”106 This is
especially important when considering the fact that the concept of individual rights is at odds
with the communal nature of tribal life. “[M]ost indigenous communities . . . define their
existence in terms of relatedness among individuals and groups, not in terms of the rights of
isolated contingent individuals.” 107 Thus, while enforcing individual rights is important to tribes,
it is not a central theme in tribal societies. Therefore, this difference, as well as others, must be
taken into account in determining whether tribes must enforce individual rights under the ICRA.
If on the other hand, a federal court pays no mind to the ICRA or the balancing test when
reviewing due process under comity, the probability that the court is relying on „westernized‟
notions of due process becomes pronounced. 108 In discussing the application of the ICRA, the
Ninth Circuit wrote “defining the limits of due process protection under the Act is not an easy
process, because . . . [due process] concepts are not readily separated from their attendant
cultural baggage; due process especially implies a number of particular procedural rights derived
from Anglo-American history.”109 However, “Even as they have recognized that ICRA grants . .
. rights comparable to those contained in the Bill of Rights, the courts routinely have ruled the
meaning and application of ICRA is not determined by Anglo-American constitutional
interpretations.”110
Thus, if a federal court deems it necessary to review due process in the first place, it must
be mindful of not simply imposing „westernized standards‟ of due process on tribal courts. “The
dominant society‟s courts may be understandably anxious to protect the rights of non-Indians in
tribal court proceedings, but those courts should not forget that the Congress has spoken about
those very matters in ICRA.” 111 In the face of positive law, the court seemingly has no choice
but to adhere to it. However, the Tenth Circuit seems to take or leave federal legislation to best
accommodate its own agenda.
iii. Specific Due Process Concerns in Burrell v. Armijo
The court in Burrell held that tribes do not necessarily have to use “procedures identical
to the U.S. Courts and federal courts should be careful to respect tribal customs and limitations
of tribal court systems.”112 However, the Burrell court did not seem inclined to follow its own
instruction. The court did not take the ICRA into account let alone the tribal interpretation of it
or any customary traditions that may have affected the tribal court proceedings. This is very
troubling because many of the court‟s concerns are things which tribes are not legislatively
106
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mandated by Congress to have, namely an appellate structure and an explicit doctrine mandating
separation of powers.
The court seems to disregard federal policy of Indian selfdetermination.113 The goal of this policy was described by President Johnson as “[a] policy of
maximum choice of the American Indian.” 114
Closely related to self-determination is the doctrine of inherent sovereignty. Tribal
sovereignty is inherent in each tribe. Their sovereignty is not a delegation. 115 Thus, while the
federal government can divest tribes of some of their authority, 116 that which remains is not
delegated, it is inherent. This difference in sovereignty is important to remember in any
discussion about Indian tribes. A tribe‟s right to self-determination does not exist because of
federal policy of self-determination; rather, a tribe‟s right to self-determination exists because it
has always existed. The federal policy, then, can be seen as recognition, not a delegation, of this
authority.
Thus, mindful of the policy guidelines and tribal circumstances the court should have
considered in reviewing tribal court proceedings under comity, this note now discusses the Tenth
Circuit‟s specific concerns about the Santa Ana Tribal Court proceeding.
a. Lack of Appeal
A major concern of the Tenth Circuit was the lack of tribal or appellate review at the
tribal level.117 The fact that tribes are not required, by the ICRA or otherwise, to have an
appellate court,118 yet are at risk of having their judgments voided for lack of one undermines
inherent tribal sovereignty to its core. If tribal judgments are voided because tribes lack an
appellate court, tribes may feel forced to implement an appellate court. This, in effect, takes
away the ability of tribes to govern themselves. Further, it highlights the distrust federal courts
have towards processes that differ from American processes and federal court preference for
applying western notions of „fairness.‟
It should also be kept in mind that the purposes of tribal dispute resolution and federal
court proceedings vary greatly. Because of the small size of tribal communities, one of the main
objectives in dispute resolution is to restore community harmony. 119 Unsettled acrimony in
small communities “can be disastrous.”120 Thus, the finality of the judgment is crucial so that the
same dispute does not keep coming up and continue indefinitely. The parties to a tribal dispute
will most likely be involved in each others daily and/or traditional lives, 121 thus a final judgment
is necessary to maintain tribal relations. An appellate review process is therefore not conducive
to the purposes of this type of system because it prolongs resolution. In comparison, the western
requirement of an appellate review is more concerned with ensuring individual rights are
113
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protected. The prolonged acrimony perpetuated by the western adversarial appellate system does
not have the same effect on the parties because they most likely are not as inextricably involved
in each others daily lives and once the dispute is over, they will probably not encounter each
other again, or want to.122 However, this avoidance is not possible in tribal communities where
relationships are “key cultural coordinates in seeking to render justice.” 123
If a tribe does not feel that it is necessary to have an appellate court, then a federal court
should not question the tribe‟s judgment on this matter, especially to the extent that the choice is
based on tribal custom. Instead, if a federal court should find itself reviewing a tribal court
judgment, it should limit itself to reviewing due process in those institutions a tribe has decided
to implement.
b. Close Relationship
The court was also troubled by the close relationship between the tribal court, council,
and individual tribal officials. 124 This encompasses two concerns generally associated with tribal
courts. First is a lack of separation of powers within tribal governments.125 Second is the
perception that a tribal judge will not be impartial because s/he knows one or more of the parties
involved.126
Many tribes were re-organized through the adoption of constitutions under the Indian
Reorganization Act (IRA).127 These constitutions were adopted from a „model‟ constitution
provided by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and did not require a separation between the
branches.128 Thus, IRA tribes typically set up their courts at the discretion and direction of the
tribal council. 129 The main reason behind this lack of separation was because of limited tribal
resources to “support separate governmental departments.”130
Santa Ana Pueblo, however, did not adopt a constitution under the IRA, instead “[t]he
pueblo functions under a traditional form of government without any written constitution or
organic governing document.”131 Thus, it is governed by the traditional methods in which the
pueblo cannot and does not separate their government from their traditional and religious
customs. “In the case of the Pueblos . . . native religious custom call for a theocratic system in
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which the religious leader appoints the governor and council, who perform both governmental
and religious functions.” 132
It is clear that this notion of separation of powers is not inherent in Pueblo tradition;
rather, it is imposed by western society. Thus, the inevitable question is, if a tribe cannot,
because of their constitution, or will not, because of religious custom, set up independent
branches like those of the U.S. government, why should they be held to such a standard?
Further, if the legislative and/or executive branches of the federal government did not require the
tribes to set up their governments exactly like the federal and state systems, then why should a
federal court be allowed to impose this type of system on tribes and/or withhold recognition of
tribal judgments for such differences? Again, holding tribal courts to a westernized standard that
is not an aspect of their political structure and/or against their religious beliefs only serves to
inhibit their sovereignty and is inconsistent with self-determination policy.
To be fair, tribal councils may have undue influence over tribal courts in some
instances. 133 However, to imply that tribal judges are powerless against influential tribal
councils is a gross generalization and further, an insult to tribal judges. In Burrell, there was no
evidence of impropriety or interference on the part of the tribal council,134 the Tenth Circuit was
merely “troubled” by the close relationship. This is not unusual for judges indoctrinated in the
American legal system; however, a close relationship cannot be interpreted to mean that tribal
court judges are inherently less trustworthy and unbiased than “American” judges. 135 Elected
state court judges can certainly be susceptible to similar political influences; however, there is
faith in the American system and in the judges to carry out equal justice. Similar faith can and
should be put in tribal judges especially when there is much evidence to suggest that tribal court
judges are committed to remaining impartial and fair.
Many tribal judges understand the importance of establishing an independent judiciary
and are not afraid to stand up to tribal councils when they feel that their independence is being
encroached on. For example, one Tribal judge testified to how she had chastised council
members who criticized her for enforcing a judgment against the tribe by telling them they were
fortunate to have a court, and that was her job to enforce the order.136 Another tribal judge
testified that after he told the council to “give us our due as an independent entity” 137 both he and
another judge “got lifetime appointments.”138 These two examples show that despite the
perceived limitations in tribal constitutions (or other forms of government) it is possible for tribal
court judges to maintain independence, moreover, councils are willing to give it to them. The
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights concluded that “a key factor in achieving judicial
independence also appeared to be the education of tribal council members on the role of the
132
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judiciary and the need for independence.” 139 This finding relates to a point made earlier that this
notion of separation of powers is not inherent in tribes. 140 If tribal councils accept the concept
and the importance of it, they will be inclined to implement it. If they are educated on the
subject, they may be more willing to give it a try. Of course tribes will need adequate funding
for such education to take place. 141
Further, tribal court judges, like other judges, have an ethical duty to maintain integrity
and legitimacy in their courts. Tribal judges understand that their decisions are not isolated
events that affect only the parties involved; rather, they understand their decisions “constitute
„social events‟ that ultimately form an important and revealing mosaic concerning the meaning
and value of law on the reservation.” 142
Especially during this time of development and scrutiny of tribal courts, tribal judges
understand that each decision they make impacts not only how the “outside” world will view the
court but also how their own community will perceive the court. Professor Frank Pommersheim
defines this awareness as a “Sacred Trust.”143 According to Pommersheim, this trust is “not so
much a legal, but rather a cultural charge . . . providing continuity and a nuanced sense of
adaptation of tradition in contemporary circumstances, while also incorporating the best from
dominant jurisprudence.”144 Pommersheim also states that the role of tribal courts is to heal a
community that has been “seriously impaired” by years of oppression. Thus, charged with such
a duty, tribal court judges have strong incentive not to interfere inappropriately in tribal court
matters. If problems do exist in individual tribes, however, Pommersheim notes that change
must come from “the inside out rather than the top down.” 145 Tribes must build systems that
work for them. Threats and demands from federal courts to implement systems exactly like the
American system will have little or no effect on tribes, other than perhaps creating animosity.
Left to exercise their sovereignty, however, tribes will develop procedures that treat everyone
fairly. Granted, these procedures may not look exactly like the American system but respect of
tribal court procedures will reflect each individual tribe‟s needs, which ultimately is the greatest
exercise of tribal sovereignty.
The second concern stemming from the „closeness‟ of the parties, council, and other
tribal officials is that a tribal judge will not be impartial because she or he knows one or more of
the parties.146 The first response is that the small size of tribes and the interconnectedness that
permeates tribal life make it “hard to believe that a person appointed or elected a tribal judge
from that community does not bring to the bench a lifetime of personal experiences that will
influence his or her decision making process.”147
Thus, the fact that one or more parties will know the tribal judge is, most likely,
unavoidable. However, this does not necessarily mean that the judge will be unfair or that the
proceedings will lack due process. Here is where tribal beliefs and Western ideas diverge once
139
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again. “Tribes, even the largest ones, are highly interconnected and dependent upon strong
interpersonal relationships.” 148 The fact that both judges and litigants, know each other and,
more importantly, having a „close interpersonal relationship‟ actually plays a crucial role in
traditional forms of Indian dispute resolution. The communal nature of a tribe is the foundation
for traditional means of dispute resolution which involves the entire community. “In closed
tribal communities” it is each member‟s duty to “perpetuate established norms.”149 Thus,
involving closely related or connected people in dispute resolution is not a breach where the
entire community is responsible for ensuring that cultural norms are adhered to.
More importantly, a judge‟s relationship to parties helps enforce the judgment as “[t]ribal
methodology begins with . . . focusing on duties and legitimate expectations attached to . . .
relationships.”150 Thus, when the judgment is issued by someone that one not only knows but
has a relationship with, there is an increased possibility of compliance because of the sense of
duty to one another as a part of that relationship.
Therefore, a judge familiar with the norms and the members of the community
necessarily presides to achieve not only the results in traditional dispute resolution but also
compliance.
c. Time
The court‟s final concern was the length of time the tribal court took to issue a
decision.151 Tribal courts are still developing especially when compared to American courts with
more than a 200 year history. Tribal court growth has increased significantly in the past fifty
years and these courts are currently in a period of transition. 152
Overall, Indian courts have been retarded by their history. They originally were
vehicles of an outside force. Later, their intended growth as integral parts of an
Indian government was stunted by a lack of effective programming or funding, as
well as policy vacillations. However, for the past several years it has become
increasingly important that they develop as strong elements of Indian government
in order to protect the residual sovereignty of tribes . . . and to fulfill Congress‟
own requirements under the ICRA. 153
Adding to their comparative state of “infancy” is the fact that tribal courts lack many of
the resources needed to run efficient justice systems even though they are confronted with many
of the same issues as state and federal courts.154 While lack of resources certainly should not
excuse a violation of due process, lack of resources necessarily affects every aspect of a tribal
court case including timeliness. Some of the common problems faced by tribal courts include
148
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court personnel turnover, lack of training, inadequate funding for judicial salaries, inability to
conduct jury trials because of lack of funding, inadequate facilities, and need for technical
assistance.155 Any or all of these things could affect the length of time a tribal court takes to rule
on a case.
Most of these problems could be adequately addressed by more funding.156 The U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights came to this conclusion157 and recommended that Congress provide
more funding to tribal courts.
The Commission strongly supports the pending and proposed Congressional
initiatives to authorize funding of tribal courts in an amount equal to that of an
equivalent State Court . . . increased funding will allow for much needed increases
in salaries for judges, the retention of law clerks of tribal judges, the funding of
public defenders/defense counsel, and increased access to legal authorities.158
In response, in 1993, Congress passed The Indian Tribal Justice Act in which funds were
authorized for such purposes.159 However, funding was never appropriated.160 In 2003, the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights released another report which detailed the state of tribal justice
systems. 161 The Commission found that funding for Native American justice programs
represented “roughly one percent” of the Department of Justice‟s “total discretionary budget for
the last six years.”162 Further, many of the Native American programs are discretionary and
therefore, “they are subject to the priorities of the appropriators, and as a result, funding
fluctuates from year to year.”163 The effects of such funding are significant on tribal courts:
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As long as tribal courts are underfunded and unable to deal with tribal
jurisprudence, the burden . . . will continue to fall on the federal court system,
where punishments are typically harsher, perpetuating a system of dual justice for
Native Americans on reservations. Moreover, effective resolution of civil disputes
is an essential component of the governance infrastructure that tribes must
provide. Thus, in addition to ensuring order and justice, tribal courts are key to
economic development and self-sufficiency. 164
The effect most prevalent from underfunding is the ability of courts to secure and retain
qualified judges and court staff. Lack of money means that courts cannot afford to pay
competitive salaries and in many cases cannot even afford to pay full-time salaries. High
turnover rates and part-time judges fitting in duties to the tribal court around another fulltime job
will certainly affect the timeliness of court proceedings. State and federal courts certainly are not
trying to function with part-time judges and court staff. One tribal court judge complained of
having only $15,000 to run her tribal court.165
The disparity between tribal court and federal/state court funding only highlights further
the reasons why a federal court should not view tribal court judgments through the lens of
American courts. Of course, cases cannot drag on for years, but for the reasons just described,
the time issue should not be a predominant factor in analyzing due process. It may be one of
many to consider but weighed against the amount of time should be the resources readily
available to the court at that time, including such things as how many judges are employed,
whether they are full or part-time, support staff available to the judge and whether support staff
are full or part time. Thus, while four years may appear to be an unreasonably long time, it
becomes more understandable when considered in the context of inadequate funding and
unfulfilled Congressional promises.
d. What does this mean for non-Indians?
A valid and logical response to this discussion is that traditional methods are fine for
Indians but how and why should they apply to non-Indians? First, the ICRA applies to all parties
appearing before a tribal court regardless of nature of the tribal court.166 Thus, non-Indians are
guaranteed those protections in both more Americanized tribal courts as well as the more
traditional tribal courts. Tribal courts have been able to successfully protect important rights
provided under the ICRA while at the same time maintaining traditional customs. 167
[T]ribal courts have demonstrated concern for the availability of effective
remedies when tribal actions disregard individual rights . . . when lawsuits go
forward in tribal court under ICRA, tribal courts often reverse convictions and
grant remedies based on ICRA violations, their decisions strikingly consistent
with federal law. Persistent critics of tribal governments seem to presuppose that
tribal courts are incapable or unwilling to enforce the Indian Bill of Rights
164
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without close federal supervision. Yet a systematic study of 30 years of
enforcement of ICRA and other scholarly research examining tribal court
decisions have concluded otherwise.168
Further, after a study of eighty-five tribal court opinions, Professor Nell Jessup Newton
came to the conclusion that “tribal court judges work hard to make the tribal judicial system fair
for all parties appearing before them . . . the tribal member does not always defeat the nonIndians.”169 In another study, Christian M. Freitag found that when tribal courts interpret what
due process means under the ICRA, their interpretation is strikingly similar to the American
principles of due process including such things as notice, opportunity to be heard, impartiality,
and fairness. 170
This should be sufficient to ease the qualms of non-Indians appearing before a tribal
court, however, if it is not, it has been suggested tribal courts implement one system for nonIndians and one system for Indians. 171 However, as I have shown, currently most tribal courts
are not adequately funded to maintain one system. A dual system, if implemented solely under
pressure from the U.S. government, would also conflict with a tribe‟s right to make their own
decisions about their government. In the spirit of self-determination a tribe should be free to
choose the best system that works for them. Thus, a tribe may choose to use an American
infrastructure for its court, in which case a non-Indian may feel more comfortable; however, the
Supreme Court held in Santa Clara Pueblo that even “[n]onjudicial tribal institutions have . . .
been recognized as competent law-applying bodies.”172 In either case a tribe must abide by the
ICRA and therefore, non-Indians are not totally without protection. Congress has also affirmed
tribal court use of traditional customs. 173
Thus, under the federal policy of self-determination, tribal courts can utilize many
different tools. The fear that non-Indians will not be afforded due process in tribal courts is not
well-founded. Tribal courts afford due process similar to federal and state courts and,
accordingly, have interpreted and implemented the ICRA fairly with respect to both Indians and
non-Indians.
When the relevant cultural circumstances are taken into account it becomes clearer that
the Burrells were afforded sufficient due process in the tribal court. They were given two days
of evidentiary hearings, thus, were given an opportunity to be heard. Since tribes are immune
from suit,174 the adverse ruling based on sovereign immunity probably would not have been
different if any of the other factors mentioned by the court 175 had been different. The other
factors discussed such as the purposes of traditional dispute resolution and the theocratic nature
of Santa Ana Pueblo‟s tribal government may have also played a part in the functioning of the
tribal court. However, the court did not focus on or consider the possibility of any of this, it
168
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instead focused on whether tribal court due process conformed to American notions of due
process. Such reliance, with no consideration of relevant tribal customs and interpretations, is
neither fair nor applicable to tribal courts.
C. Jurisdiction
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the Burrell decision is that the Tenth Circuit could
have reached the same result without impugning the tribal court. That is, the Court could have
refused to recognize the judgment based solely on jurisdiction. This would have been a better
way to rule for two reasons. First, it falls in line with more acceptable federal review of tribal
courts. Second, it would have preserved the legitimacy of the tribal court.
With a few limited exceptions,176 the doctrine of exhaustion is the only way a federal
court has disturbed a tribal court judgment. Exhaustion applies only to civil cases and requires
that a plaintiff whose claim arises on Indian land, exhaust his or her tribal court remedies before
seeking federal relief. 177 If tribal court remedies are exhausted, the federal court is limited to
reviewing whether the tribal court had jurisdiction.178 The court did not apply the exhaustion
doctrine in Burrell, but even under its preferred doctrine of comity it could have reviewed
jurisdiction.
The court held that the Burrells did not make a clear jurisdictional argument, thus it did
not rule on this issue. 179 However, the court could have raised the issue of jurisdiction sua
sponte. “There is no controlling precedent on raising the jurisdiction of the tribal court sua
sponte, but the best conclusion is that we may do so.”180 Judge McConnell went on to note in his
concurring opinion:
Without a discretionary power to raise a tribal court‟s jurisdiction sua sponte, the
federal court could be in the awkward position of acceding to the judgment of a
court that self-evidently lacked jurisdiction. Justice requires not only recognizing
the judgments of courts of competent jurisdiction but also refusing to recognize a
judgment that manifestly lacks legal validity. 181
As noted above, under comity there are two mandatory grounds for refusing to recognize
a tribal court judgment, lack of jurisdiction and lack of due process.182 In Burrell, the court was
adamant that comity was the appropriate doctrine to apply. However, it did not adhere to the
doctrine when it only applied comity to find a due process reason to void the tribal judgment but
did not apply the other part of the comity analysis and review jurisdiction. If it had done this
first, it could have reached the same result without ever reaching the merits of the Burrell‟s due
process claim. The fact that the court went directly to due process analysis and did not raise
jurisdiction seems to be another indication of the distrust the federal courts have towards tribal
courts and, perhaps, even an indication of the Tenth Circuit‟s underlying agenda to withhold
comity.
176
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Had the court raised jurisdiction sua sponte, it could have found that the tribal court had
no jurisdiction over the Burrell‟s constitutional claims. For example, Nevada v. Hicks183 held
that tribes do not have jurisdiction over § 1983 claims. 184 Nevada involved a state official
executing a search warrant on tribal land. The tribal member/owner of the land then sued the
official in tribal court claiming violations of § 1983.185 The Supreme Court held the tribal court
lacked jurisdiction over that claim in particular, because tribal courts are not courts of general
jurisdiction186 and because if these types of suits are brought in tribal court, defendants would be
denied the right of removal. 187 The Burrell court could have easily and logically extended this
same reasoning to §1981 and §1985 actions and found that no jurisdiction over these claims lie
in tribal court. In fact, in a concurring opinion of Burrell, Judge McConnell argued as much. “I
see no reason to distinguish the § 1983 claim in Hicks from the Burrells‟ § 1981 and § 1985
claims . . . It follows that the tribal court was not a “court of competent jurisdiction,” and its
ruling is therefore entitled neither to deference nor to preclusive effect.” 188
Of course this piece meal, case by case, stripping of tribal court jurisdiction is also bad
for tribal courts and incongruous with federal policy promoting tribal self-government.
However, at least a holding based solely on jurisdiction falls in line with controlling precedent,
which the Burrell holding arguably does not. Further, a jurisdictional ruling gives grounds on
which the court could have rested its decision without de-legitimizing the tribal court.
Many other cases, even those adhering to the traditional comity doctrine, have declined to
recognize tribal court judgments based solely on lack of jurisdiction.189 In fact, the Wilson case
relied on heavily in Burrell was decided this way. 190 Relatively few cases have declined to
recognize a tribal court judgment based on alleged lack of due process in the tribal court.191
Thus, by far, the more acceptable way for federal courts to refuse comity to tribal courts has been
based on a finding of lack of jurisdiction.
V. IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
The implications of this decision are potentially devastating for tribal courts. The court in
Burrell has given the impression that federal courts might properly be general appellate bodies
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for tribal courts. This is in stark contrast to the dual sovereignty doctrines set out in Wheeler.192
This doctrine holds that federal courts and tribal courts derive their power from separate sources
and therefore, unless specifically prohibited by Congress, tribal courts are allowed to enforce
their own laws at their own discretion without being inhibited by other sovereigns.193 Accepting
this proposition as true, how can a court from one sovereign act as a general reviewing body of
another? Would the federal court allow such review of its proceedings by a tribal court?
Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit has now opened the door for federal court review of tribal
court judgments. If the tribes want to keep federal courts out of their proceedings, they will have
to make substantial changes. Most profoundly, allowing civil suits in tribal courts against tribal
officials for various offenses. An underlying theme in many cases withholding comity from
tribal courts is the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Federal courts seem troubled by the fact that
plaintiffs, especially non-Indian plaintiffs, have no relief when alleging wrongs by a tribe and/or
its officials. 194 Tribes may even want to consider allowing suits against the tribe itself in certain
circumstances similar to the Federal and various state Tort Claims Acts.
Another possible implication of the Burrell holding is that the Santa Ana Tribal Court did
not or cannot adequately protect litigant‟s due process rights. If generalized, this could lead to
more or stricter rules for tribal courts as well as open the door for federal court review of due
process violations in tribal courts. This however, is in conflict with the findings that tribes have
been able to effectively implement the ICRA and have successfully protected individual‟s
rights.195 Tribes, not federal courts, are in the best position to enforce ICRA rights 196 and more
rules will lead to restricting tribal sovereignty even further. Even if no further guidelines are
imposed, this decision may nevertheless have a chilling effect on the development and use of
tribal courts.
The Tenth Circuit leaves the impression that tribal courts are inherently unfair because
they do not conform to American notions of due process. If the Burrells were truly concerned
about their due process rights and the court truly wanted to “provide great deference to tribal
court systems, their practices and procedures,”197 the district court should have ordered the
Burrells to vindicate their due process claims in tribal court under an ICRA proceeding as set out
in Santa Clara Pueblo. 198 The tribal court should have had the first chance to review the due
process challenges of its own court. However, the Santa Ana Tribal Court was not afforded that
right, the reviewing function having been usurped by the federal court. The Burrell case now
puts in jeopardy that important right held by tribes since Santa Clara Pueblo.
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There may be one possible positive outcome of this case. It is and has been apparent to
Congress that tribal courts need more funding. 199 Thus, a hopeful implication of this ruling is
that Congress will be informed to appropriate the money necessary for tribal courts to function as
properly funded institutions protecting tribal sovereignty. While it is clear that Congressional
policy is to promote tribal self-government and self-determination, words alone are not enough.
If Congress wants to make clear to federal courts and to tribes that the federal government is
really committed to the current policy of self-determination and self-sufficiency, it must provide
proper funding.
VI. CONCLUSION
As part of the overriding federal policy of promoting tribal government, federal courts
have already been precluded from reviewing due process in tribal courts. Further, as this note
has indicated, tribes are bound only by the ICRA and tribes can and have upheld the provisions
of the ICRA in their courts. All of these factors are at odds with the doctrine of comity as
applied by the Tenth Circuit and further, seem to conclusively limit the role of federal courts in
reviewing tribal court judgments. However, the federal courts seem intent on interfering with
tribal court judgments and extending stricter requirements on tribal courts.
The Burrell holding has the potentially devastating effect on tribal court cases
increasingly being reviewed for due process violations by federal courts. While the Burrells
may or may not have been treated unfairly in their particular tribal proceedings, the Tenth Circuit
announcing so, especially when it did not have to, makes the Santa Ana Tribal Court suspect.
Burrell is highly inconsistent with the federal policy of tribal self-determination and puts the
legitimacy of all tribal courts in jeopardy.

POSTCRIPT
The Burrells were awarded $1.3 million by a jury in the Federal District Court for the
District of New Mexico. 200 As to the Burrells’ 1981 & 1985 claims against the individual tribal
officials, the jury found that Leonard Armijo, Santa Ana Governor and acting Police Chief in
1997, and Lawrence Montoya, Lieutenant Governor, conspired and violated the Burrells’ civil
rights regarding their farm lease.201 On April 27, 2010, the Tenth Circuit overturned the
Federal District Court’s ruling that the Governor was not immune and affirmed the Federal
District Court’s ruling that the Lieutenant Governor was immune, thus ruling both officers acted
within their official capacity and were immune.202
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